The way that people make choices or exhibit preferences can be strongly affected by the set of available alternatives, often called the choice set. Furthermore, there are usually heterogeneous preferences, either at an individual level within small groups or within sub-populations of large groups. Given the availability of choice data, there are now many models that capture this behavior in order to make effective predictions. However, there is little work in understanding how directly changing the choice set can be used to influence a group's preferences or decisions. Here, we use discrete choice modeling to develop an optimization framework of such interventions for several problems of group influence, including maximizing agreement or disagreement and promoting a particular choice. We show that these problems are NP-hard in general but imposing restrictions reveals a fundamental boundary: promoting an item is easier than maximizing agreement or disagreement. After, we design approximation algorithms for the hard problems and show that they work extremely well for real-world choice data.
INTRODUCTION
Choosing from a set of alternatives is one of the most important actions people take, and choices determine the composition of governments, the success of corporations, and the formation of social connections. For these reasons, choice models have received significant attention in the fields of economics [51] , psychology [54] , and, as human-generated data has become increasingly available online, computer science [38, 44, 45] . In many cases, it is important that people have heterogeneous preferences; for example, people living in different parts of a town might prefer different government policies.
Much of the computational work on choice has been devoted to fitting models for predicting future choices. In addition to passive prediction, another area of interest is determining effective interventions to influence choice; advertising and political campaigning are prime examples. In heterogeneous groups, the goal might be to encourage consensus [1] , or, in adversarial situations, to sow discord, e.g., amongst political parties [43] .
One particular method of influence is introducing new alternatives or options. While early economic models assume that alternatives are irrelevant to the relative ranking of options [27, 31] , experimental work has consistently found that new alternatives have strong effects on our choices [18, 47, 49, 52] ; these effects are often called context effects or choice set effects. A well-known example is the compromise effect [48] , which describes how people often prefer a middle ground (e.g., the middle-priced wine). Direct measurement on choice data have also revealed choice set effects in several domains [4, 45] .
Here, we pose adding new alternatives as a discrete optimization problem for influencing a group of decision makers. To this end, we consider various models for how someone makes a choice from a given set of alternatives, where the model parameters can be readily estimated from data. In our setup, everyone has a base set of alternatives from which they make a choice, and the goal is to find a set of additional alternatives to optimize some function of the group's joint preferences on the base set. We specifically analyze three objective functions: (i) agreement in preferences amongst the group; (ii) disagreement in preferences amongst the group; and (iii) promotion of a particular item.
We use the framework of discrete choice [51] to probabilistically model how someone makes a choice from a given set of alternatives, called the choice set. These models are parameterized for individual preferences; when fitting parameters from data, preferences are commonly aggregated at the level of a sub-population of individuals. Discrete choice models such as the multinomial logit and elimination-by-aspects have played a central role in behavioral economics for several decades with diverse applications, including forest management [15] , social networks formation [38] , and marketing campaigns [12] . More recently, new choice data and algorithms have spurred machine learning research on models for choice set effects [9, 40, 41, 44, 45] .
We provide the relevant background on discrete choice models in Section 2. From this, we formally define and analyze three choice set optimization problems-Agreement, Disagreement, and Promotion-and analyze them under four discrete choice models: multinomial logit [31] , the context dependent random utility model [45] , nested logit [32] , and elimination-by-aspects [53] . We first prove that the choice set optimization problems are NP-hard in general for these models. After, we identify natural restrictions of the problems under which they become tractable. These restrictions reveal a fundamental boundary: promoting a particular item within a group is easier than minimizing or maximizing conflict. More specifically, we show that restricting the choice models can make Promotion tractable while leaving Agreement and Disagreement NP-hard, indicating that the interaction between individuals introduces significant complexity to choice set optimization.
After this, we provide efficient approximation algorithms with guarantees for all three problems under several choice models, and we validate our algorithms on choice data. Model parameters are learned for different types of individuals based on features (e.g., where someone lives). From these learned models, we apply our algorithms to optimize group-level preferences. Our algorithms outperform a natural baseline on real-world data coming from transportation choices, insurance policy purchases, and online shopping.
Related work
Our work fits within recent interest from computer science and machine learning on discrete choice models in general and choice set effects in particular. For example, choice set effects abundant in online data has led to richer data models [6, 19, 28, 41, 44, 45] , new methods for testing the presence of choice set effects [4, 45, 46] , and new learning algorithms [9, 23] . More broadly, there are efforts on learning algorithms for multinomial logits mixtures [2, 21, 36, 57] , Placket-Luce models [30, 56] , and other random utility models [5, 8, 37] .
One of our optimization problems is maximizing group agreement by introducing new alternatives. This is motivated in part by how additional context can sway opinion on controversial topics [14, 25, 34] . There are also related algorithms for decreasing polarization in social networks [7, 13, 29, 35] , although we have no explicit network and adopt a choice-theoretic framework.
Finally, our problems relate to group decision-making. In psychology, introducing new shared information is critical for group decisions [26, 50] . And in computer science, the complexity of group Bayesian reasoning is a concern [16, 17].
BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARIES
We first introduce the discrete choice models that we analyze. In our context, one or more individuals is each making a (possibly random) choice of a single alternative (item) from a finite set of alternatives called a choice set. We use U to denote the universe of items and C ⊆ U the choice set. Thus, given C, an individual chooses an item x ∈ C.
Given C, a discrete choice model induces a probability for choosing each item x ∈ C. We analyze four broad discrete choice models that are all random utility models (RUMs), which derive from economic rationality. In a RUM, an individual observes a random utility for each item x ∈ C and then chooses the one with the largest utility. We model each individual's choices through the same RUM but with possibly different parameters to capture preference heterogeneity. In this sense, we have a mixture model.
Choice data typically contains many observations from various choice sets. One person might make multiple choices, but we usually have data from a larger population. Thus, parameters for heterogeneous preferences capture sub-populations or types of individuals. For convenience, we still use "individual" or "person" when referring to parameters for a given type. We use "group" to refer to the entire population or the set of types. We use A to denote the set of individuals, and a ∈ A indexes model parameters.
The parameters of the RUMs we analyze can be inferred from data, and our theoretical results and algorithms assume that we have learned these parameters. Our theoretical analysis is specifically focused on how the probability of selecting an item x from a choice set C changes as we add new alternative items from C = U \ C to the choice set.
We let n = |A|, k = |C |, and m = |C | for notation. We mostly use n = 2, which is sufficient for hardness proofs.
Multinomial logit (MNL)
The multinomial logit (MNL) model [31] is the workhorse of discrete choice theory. In MNL, an individual a's preferences are encoded by a true utility u a (x) for every item x ∈ U. The observations are noisy random utilitiesũ a (x) = u a (x) + ε, where ε follows a Gumbel distribution. Under this model, the probability that individual a picks item x from choice set C (i.e., x = arg max y ∈Cũ a (y)) is the softmax over item utilities:
y ∈C e u a (y)
.
We use the term exp-utility to refer to e u a (x ) . The utility of an item is often parameterized as a function of features of the item in order to generalize to unseen data; for example, a linear function is an additive utility model [55] and looks like logistic regression. For our analysis, we work directly with the utilities. The MNL satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) [27] , the property that for any two choice sets C, D and two items x, y ∈ C ∩ D:
In other words, the choice set has no effect on a's relative probability of choosing x or y. 1 Although IIA is intuitively pleasing, behavioral experiments show that it is often violated in practice [18, 49] . Thus, there are many models that account for IIA violations, including the other ones we analyze.
Context-dependent random utility model (CDM)
The context-dependent random utility model (CDM) [45] is an extension of MNL that can model IIA violations. The core idea is to approximate choice set effects by the effect of each item's presence on the utilities of the other items. For instance, a diner's preference for a rib eye steak may decrease relative to a fish option if a filet mignon is also available. Formally, each item z exerts a pull on a's utility from x, which we denote p a (z, x). The CDM then resembles the MNL with utilities u a (x | C) = u a (x) + z ∈C p a (z, x). This leads to choice probabilities that are a softmax over the contextdependent utilities:
y ∈C e u a (y |C)
(3)
Nested logit (NL)
The nested logit (NL) model [32] instead accounts for choice set effects by grouping similar items into nests that people choose between successively. For example, a diner may first choose between a vegetarian, fish, or steak meal and then select a particular dish. NL can be derived by introducing correlation between the random utility noise ε in MNL; here, we instead consider a generalized tree-based version of the model. 2 The (generalized) NL model for an individual a consists of a tree T a with a leaf for each item in U, where the internal nodes represent categories of items. Rather than having a utility only on items, each person a also has utilities u a (v) on all nodes v ∈ T a (except the root). Given a choice set C, let T a (C) be the subtree of T a induced by C and all ancestors of C. To choose an item from C, a starts at the root and repeatedly picks between the children of the current node according to the MNL model until reaching a leaf.
Elimination-by-aspects (EBA)
While the previous models are based on MNL, the elimination-byaspects (EBA) model [53] has a different structure. In EBA, each item x has a set of aspects x ′ representing properties of the item, and person a has a utility u a (χ ) > 0 on each aspect χ . An item is chosen by repeatedly picking an aspect with probability proportional to its utility and eliminating all items that do not have that aspect until only one item remains (or, if all remaining items have the same aspects, the choice is made uniformly at random). For example, a diner may first eliminate items that are too expensive, then disregard meat options, and finally look for dishes with pasta before choosing mushroom ravioli. Formally, let C ′ = x ∈C x ′ be the set of aspects of items in C and let C 0 = x ∈C x ′ be the aspects shared by all items in C. Additionally, let
The probability that individual a picks item x from choice set C is recursively defined as
If all remaining items have the same aspects (C ′ = C 0 ), the denominator is zero, and Pr(a ← x | C) = 1 |C | in that case.
Encoding MNLs in other models
Although the three models with context effects appear quite different, they all subsume the MNL model. Thus, if we prove a problem hard under MNL, then it is hard under all four models.
Lemma 1. The MNL model is a special case of the CDM, NL, and EBA models.
Proof. Let M be an MNL model. For the CDM, use the utilities from M and set all pulls to 0. For NL, make all items children of T a 's root and use the utilities from M. Lastly, for EBA, assign a unique aspect χ x to each item x ∈ U with utility u a (χ x ) = e u a (x ) . Following (4),
CHOICE SET OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
By introducing new alternatives to the choice set C, we can modify the relationships amongst individual preferences to influence the group. Similar ideas are well-studied in voting models, e.g., introducing alternatives to change winners selected by Borda count [11] .
Here, we study how to optimize choice sets for various group-level objectives, measured in terms of individual choice probabilities coming from discrete choice models.
Minimizing or maximizing (dis)agreement
Since we are modeling the preferences of a group, one important metric is the amount of disagreement in the group about which item to select. Given any set of alternatives Z ⊆ C we might introduce, we quantify the disagreement this would induce as the sum of all pairwise differences between individual choice probabilities over C:
Here, we care about the disagreement on the original choice set C created by the new choice set C ∪Z . In this setup, C could represent core options (e.g., two major health care policies under deliberation) and Z some additional alternatives designed to sway opinions. Concretely, we study the following problem: given A, C, C, and a choice model, minimize (or maximize) D(Z ) over Z ⊆ C. We call the minimization problem Agreement and the maximization problem Disagreement. Agreement has applications in encouraging consensus, while Disagreement yields insight into how susceptible a group may be to an adversary who wishes to increase conflict.
Promotion
Another natural objective is to promote an item, which is of considerable interest in online advertising and content recommendation. Given A, C, C, a choice model, and a target item x * ∈ C, the Promotion problem is to find the set of alternatives Z ⊆ C whose introduction maximizes the number of individuals whose "favorite" item in C is x * . Formally, this means maximizing the number of individuals a ∈ A for which Pr(a ← x * | C ∪ Z ) > Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ), x ∈ C, x x * . This also has applications in voting, where questions about the influence of new candidates constantly arise. One of our contributions in this paper is showing that promotion is often easier (in a computational complexity sense) than disagreement optimization.
HARDNESS RESULTS
We now characterize the computational complexity of Agreement, Disagreement, and Promotion under the four discrete choice models. We first show that Agreement and Disagreement are NP-hard under all four models and that Promotion is NP-hard under the three models with context effects. After, we prove that imposing additional restrictions on these discrete choice models can make Promotion tractable while leaving Agreement and Disagreement NP-hard.
Some choice models have extra degrees of freedom, e.g., MNL has additive-shift-invariant utilities. For inference, we can just a standard form (such as sum of utilities equals zero). For ease of analysis, we do not use such standard forms, but the choice probabilities remain unambiguous.
Agreement
Although the MNL model does not have any context effects, introducing alternatives to the choice set can still affect the relative preferences of two different individuals. In particular, introducing alternatives can impact disagreement in a sufficiently complex way to make identifying the optimal set of alternatives computationally 3 hard. Our proof of Theorem 2 uses a very simple MNL in the reduction, with only two individuals and two items in C, where the two individuals have exactly the same utilities on alternatives. In other words, even when individuals agree on new alternatives, making them agree on the choice set is hard.
Theorem 2. In the MNL model, Agreement is NP-hard, even with just two items in C and two individuals that have identical utilities on items in C.
Proof. By reduction from Partition. Let S be the set of integers we wish to partition into two subsets with equal sum. We construct an instance of Disagreement with A = {a, b}, C = {x, y}, C = S (abusing notation to identify alternatives with the Partition integers). Let t = 1 2 z ∈S z. We define the utilities to be:
The total exp-utility of all items in C is 2t. On the interval [0, 2t], D(Z ) acheives its minimum 1 6 at s Z = t (Appendix Fig. 3 ). Thus, if we could efficiently find the set Z minimizing D(Z ), then we could efficiently solve Partition. □ From Lemma 1, the other models we consider can all encode any MNL instance, which leads to the following corollary. Corollary 1. Agreement is NP-hard in the CDM, NL, and EBA models.
Disagreement
Using a similar strategy, we can construct an MNL instance whose disagreement is maximized rather than minimized at a particular target value (Theorem 3). The reduction requires an even simpler MNL setup. Theorem 3. In the MNL model, Disagreement is NP-hard, even with just one item in C and two individuals that have identical utilities on items in C.
Proof. By reduction from Subset Sum. Let S be a set of positive integers with target t.
For s Z ≥ 0, this function achieves its maximum 1 3 at s Z = t (Appendix Fig. 3 ). Thus, if we could efficiently maximize D(Z ), then we could efficiently solve Subset Sum. □ By Lemma 1, we again have the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Disagreement is NP-hard in the CDM, NL, and EBA models.
Promotion
In choice models with no context effects, Promotion has a constanttime solution: under IIA, the presence of alternatives has no effect on an individual's relative preference for items in C. However, Promotion is more interesting with context effects, and we show that it is NP-hard for CDM, NL, and EBA. In Section 4.4, we will show that restrictions of these models make Promotion tractable but keep Agreement and Disagreement hard. Theorem 4. In the CDM model, Promotion is NP-hard, even with just one individual and three items in C.
Proof. By reduction from Subset Sum. Let set S with target t be an instance of Subset Sum. Let A = {a}, C = {x * , w, y}, C = S. Using tuples interpreted entry-wise for brevity, suppose that we have the following utilities: u a (⟨x * , w, y⟩ | C) = ⟨1, t, −t⟩, u a (z) = −∞ for all z ∈ C, and p a (z, ⟨x * , w, y⟩) = ⟨z, 0, 2z⟩ for all z ∈ C. We wish to promote x * . Let s Z = z ∈Z z. When we include the alternatives in Z , x * is the most likely to be chosen if and only if 1 + s Z > t and 1 + s Z > −t + 2s Z . Since s Z and t are integers, this is only possible if s Z = t. Thus, if we could efficiently promote x * , then we could efficiently solve Subset Sum. □
We use the same Goldilocks strategy in our proofs for the NL and EBA models (details in Appendix A): by carefully defining utilities, we create choice instances where the optimal promotion solution is to pick just the right quantity of alternatives to increase preference for one item without going past the target. However, the NL model poses a novel challenge compared to the CDM. With CDM, alternatives can increase the choice probability of an item in C, but in the NL, new alternatives only lower choice probabilities. Nonetheless, promotion is still difficult.
Theorem 5. In the NL model, Promotion is NP-hard, even with just two individuals and two items in C.
This construction relies on the two individuals having different tree structures for their nested logits. We will see in Section 4.4 that this is a necessary condition for the hardness of Promotion. Finally, we have the following hardness result for EBA, the proof of which is also in Appendix A. Theorem 6. In the EBA model, Promotion is NP-hard, even with just two individuals and two items in C.
Restricted models that make promotion easier
We now show that, in some sense, Promotion is a fundamentally easier problem than Agreement or Disagreement. Specifically, there are simple restrictions on CDM, NL, and EBA that make Promotion tractable but leave Agreement and Disagreement NP-hard. Importantly, these restrictions still allow for context effects; in particular, they do not degenerate into an MNL, in which promoting an item through introducing alternatives is impossible.
In Appendix B, we also prove a strong restriction on the MNL model where Agreement and Disagreement are tractable, but we could not find meaningful restrictions for similar results on the other models. 4
4.4.1 2-item CDM with equal context effects. The proof of Theorem 4 shows that Promotion is hard with only a single individual and three items in C. However, if C only has two items and context effects are the same (i.e., p a (z, ·) is the same for all z ∈ C), then Promotion is tractable. The optimal solution is to include all alternatives that increase utility for x * more than the other item, as doing so makes strict progress on promoting x * . If individuals have different context effects or if there are more than two items, then there can be conflicts between which items should be included. Although this restriction makes Promotion tractable, it leaves Agreement and Disagreement NP-hard: the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 can be interpreted as 2-item and 1-item CDMs with equal (zero) context effects.
Same-tree NL.
If we require that all individuals share the same NL tree structure, but still allow different utilities, then promotion becomes tractable. For each z ∈ C, we can determine whether it reduces the relative choice probability of x * based on its position in the tree: adding z decreases the relative choice probability of x * if and only if z is a sibling of any ancestor of x * (including x * ) or if it causes such a sibling to be added to T a (C). Thus, the solution to Promotion is to include all z not in those positions, which is a polynomial-time check. This restriction leaves Agreement and Disagreement NP-hard via Theorems 2 and 3 as we can still encode any MNL model in a same-tree NL using the tree in which all items are children of the root.
4.4.3
Disjoint-aspect EBA. The following condition on aspects makes promoting x * tractable: for all z ∈ C, either z ′ ∩ x * ′ = ∅ or z ′ ∩ y ′ = ∅ for all y ∈ C, y x * . That is, alternatives either share no aspects with x * or share no aspects with other items in C. This prevents alternatives from cannibalizing from both x * and its competitors. To promote x * , we include all alternatives that share aspects with x * 's competitors but not x * , which strictly promotes x * . This condition is slightly weaker than requiring all items to have disjoint aspects, which degenerates to MNL. However, this condition is again not sufficient to make Agreement and Disagreement tractable, since any MNL model can be encoded in a disjoint-aspect EBA instance.
APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS
Thus far, we have seen that several interesting group decisionmaking problems are NP-hard across standard discrete choice models. Here, we provide a positive result: we can compute arbitrarily good approximate solutions to many instances of these problems in polynomial time. We focus our analysis on Algorithm 1, which is an ε-additive approximation algorithm to Agreement under MNL, with runtime polynomial in k, m, and 1 ε , but exponential in n (recall that k = |C |, m = |C |, and n = |A|). In contrast, the brute force approach of testing every possible set of alternatives is exponential in m and polynomial in k and n. Agreement is NP-hard even with n = 2 (Theorem 2), so our algorithm provides a substantial efficiency improvement. We discuss how to extend this algorithm to other objectives (such as Disagreement and Promotion) and other choice models later in the section. Algorithm 1 is based on an FPTAS for Subset Sum [10] , and the first parts of our analysis follow some of the same steps. The core Algorithm 1 ε-additive approximation for Agreement in the MNL model. 1 Input: n individuals A, k items C, m alternatives C, utilities u a (·) > 0 2 e ax ← e u a (x ) , s a ← z ∈C e az , δ ← ε/(2km n 2 ) 3 L 0 ← empty n-dimensional array * whose ath dimension has
. . , t n + e a n z 11 compute D(Z ) for every set Z in L m (see Eq. (5)) 12 return the set that resulted in minimal disagreement * We use a hash table in practice since L i is typically sparse.
idea of our algorithm is that a set of items can be characterized by its exp-utility sums for each individual and that there are only polynomially many combinations of exp-utility sums that differ by more than a multiplicative factor 1+δ . We can therefore compute all sets of alternatives with meaningfully different impacts and pick the best one. For the purpose of the algorithm, we assume all utilities are positive (otherwise we may access a negative index); utilities can always be shifted by a constant to satisfy this requirement. Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 is an ε-additive approximation for Agreement in the MNL model.
Proof. We will use the following lemma: Lemma 8. Let C i be the first i elements processed by the outer for loop. At the end of the algorithm, for all Z ⊆ C i with exp-utility totals t a , there exists some Z ′ ∈ L i with exp-utility totals t ′ a such that t a (1+δ ) i < t ′ a < t a (1 + δ ) i , for all a ∈ A (with δ as defined in Algorithm 1, Line 2).
The proof is in Appendix C. Now let β = ε/(k n 2 ). Following our choice of δ and using Lemma 8, at the end of the algorithm, the optimal disagreement set Z * ⊆ C has some representative Z ′ in L m such that
Since e x ≥ (1 + x/m) m , we have:
Finally, t * a 1+β < t ′ a < t * a (1 + β) since 0 < β < 1. Now we show that D(Z * ) and D(Z ′ ) differ by at most ε. To do so, we first bound the difference between Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z * ) and 5
Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) by β. Let c a be the total exp-utility of a on C.
By the above reasoning, e ax c a + t * a (1 + β)
where the middle term is equal to Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ). From the lower bound, the difference between Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z * ) and Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) could be as large as
Now for the upper bound, the difference between Pr(a ← x | C∪Z * ) and Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) could be as large as
Thus, Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z * ) and Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) differ by at most β 2 . Using the same argument for an individual b, the disagreement between a and b about x can only increase by β with the set Z compared to the optimal set Z * . Since there are n 2 pairs of individuals and k items in C, the total error of the algorithm is bounded by k n 2 β = ε. □
We now show that the runtime of Algorithm 1 is O((m +kn 2 )(1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) n ), where s = max a s a is the maximum exp-utility sum for any individual. Thus, for any fixed n, this runtime is bounded by a polynomial in k, m, and 1 ε . To see this, first note that the size of L m is bounded above by (1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) n . For each z ∈ C, we perform constant-time operations on each entry of L m , for a total of O(m(1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) n ) time. Then we compute D(Z ) for each cell of L m , which takes O(kn 2 ) time per cell. The total runtime is therefore O((m + kn 2 )(1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) n ) as claimed. Finally, (1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) n is bounded by a polynomial in m, k, and 1 ε for any fixed n (see Appendix C.2).
We have seen that Agreement is NP-hard even when individuals have equal utilities on alternatives. In this case, we only need to compute exp-utility sums for a single individual, which brings its running time down to O((m + kn 2 ) log 1+δ s).
Extensions to other objectives and models
Algorithm 1 can be easily extended to any objective function that is efficiently computable from utilities. For instance, Algorithm 1 can be adapted for Disagreement by replacing the word "minimal" with the word "maximal" in Line 12.
Algorithm 1 can also be adapted for CDM and NL. The analysis is similar and details are in Appendix C, although the running times and guarantees are different. With CDM, the exponent in the runtime increases to nk for Agreement/Disagreement, and the ε-additive approximation is guaranteed only if items in C exert zero pulls on each other. However, even for the general CDM, our experiments will show that the adapted algorithm remains a useful heuristic. When we adapt Algorithm 1 for NL, we retain the full approximation guarantee but the exponent in the runtime increases and has a dependence on the tree size. Promotion is not interesting under MNL and also has a discrete rather than continuous objective, i.e., the number of people with favorite item x * in C. For models with context effects, we can define a meaningful notion of approximation.
A solution then ε-approximates Promotion if the number of people for whom x * is an ε-favorite item is at least the value of the optimal Promotion solution. Using this, we can adapt Algorithm 1 for Promotion for CDM and NL. Again, the CDM version has approximation guarantees in certain parameter regimes and the NL has full approximation guarantees. Since we do not have compute D(Z ), the runtimes lose the kn 2 term compared to the Agreement/Disagreement versions (Appendix C.5).
Finally, EBA has considerably different structure than the other models. We leave algorithms for EBA for future work.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We apply our methods to three datasets ( Table 1 ). The SFWork dataset [24] comes from a survey of San Francisco residents on available (choice set) and selected (choice) transportation options to get to work. We split the respondents into two segments (|A| = 2) according to whether or not they live in the "core residential district of San Fransisco or Berkeley." The Allstate dataset [20] consists of insurance policies (items) characterized by anonymous categorical features A-G with 2 to 4 values each. Each customer views a set of policies (the choice set) before purchasing one. We reduce the number of items to 24 by considering only features A, B, and C. To model different types of individuals, we split the data into homeowners and non-homeowners (again, |A| = 2). The Yoochoose dataset [3] contains online shopping data. Clicks and purchases were stored for user browsing sessions of categorized items. Choice sets are unique categories browsed in a session and the choice is the category of the purchased product (categories appearing fewer than 20 times were omitted). We split the choice 6 data into two nearly equal-sized sub-populations by thresholding on the purchase timestamps.
For inferring maximum-likelihood models from data, we use PyTorch's Adam optimizer [22, 39] with learning rate 0.05, weight decay 0.00025, batch size 128, and the amsgrad flag [42] . We use the low-rank (rank-2) CDM [45] that expresses pulls as the inner product of item embeddings. Our code-including implementations of Algorithm 1 and instructions for reproducing all experiments-is avilable at https://github.com/tomlinsonk/choice-set-opt.
For SFWork under the MNL, CDM, and NL models, we considered all 2-item choice sets C (using all other items for C) for Agreement and Disagreement (for the NL model, we used the best-performing tree from Koppelman and Bhat [24] ). We compare Algorithm 1 (ε = 0.01) to a greedy approach (henceforth, "Greedy") that builds Z by repeatedly selecting the item from C that, when added to Z , most improves the objective, if such an item exists. This dataset was small enough to compare against the optimal, bruteforce solution ( Table 2 ). In all cases, Algorithm 1 finds the optimal solution, while Greedy is often suboptimal. However, for this value of ε, we find that Algorithm 1 searches the entire space and actually computes the brute force solution (we get the number of sets analyzed by Algorithm 1 from |L m | for a given ε and compare it to 2 |C | ). Even though we have an asymptotic polynomial runtime guarantee, for small enough datasets, we might not see computational savings. Running with larger ε yielded similar results, even for ε > 2, when our bounds are vacuous.
The results still highlight two important points. First, even on small datasets, Greedy can be sub-optimal. For example, for Agreement under CDM with C = {drive alone, transit}, Algorithm 1 found the optimal solution Z = {bike, walk}, inferring that both sub-populations agree on both driving less and taking transit less. However, Greedy just introduced a car pooling option, which has a much lower effect on discouraging driving alone or taking transit, thereby resulting in lower agreement between city and suburban residents.
Second, our theoretical bounds can be more pessimistic than what happens in practice. Thus, we can consider larger values of ε to reduce the search space; Algorithm 1 remains a principled heuristic, and we can measure how much of the search space Algorithm 1 considers. This is the approach we take for the Allstate and Yoochoose data, where find that Algorithm 1 far outperforms its theoretical worst-case bound. We again considered all 2-item choice sets C and tested our method under MNL and CDM 3 , setting ε so that the experiment took about 30 minutes to run for Allstate and 2 hours for Yoochoose. Algorithm 1 consistently outperforms Greedy (Fig. 1) , even with ε > 2 for CDM. Moreover, Algorithm 1 only computes a small fraction of possible sets of alternatives, especially for Yoochoose. Greedy does fairly well for Disagreement under CDM with Yoochoose, which is reasonable given that we only have theory for CDM under certain parameter regimes. Still, even in this case, Algorithm 1 performs significantly better in enough instances for the mean (but not median) performance to be better than Greedy.
Promotion
Finally, we applied the CDM Promotion version of Algorithm 1 for Allstate. For each 2-item choice set C, we attempted to promote the less-popular item of the pair using brute-force, the greedy algorithm, and Algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 promoted items optimally in all cases, up to ε = 64, above which it failed in only 2-18 of 276 choice sets (Fig. 2, left) . (Here, successful promotion means that the item becomes the true favorite among C, not the ε-favorite.)
On the other hand, Greedy failed in 43% of the instances. As in the previous experiment, our algorithm's performance in practice far exceeds the worst-case bounds. The number of sets tested by Algorithm 1 falls dramatically as ε increases (Fig. 2, right) . With more items (or a smaller range of utilities), the value of ε required to achieve the same speedup over brute force would be smaller (as with Yoochoose). In tandem, these results show that we get nearoptimal Promotion performance with far fewer set computations than brute force.
CONCLUSION
Our choices are influenced by the alternatives that are available to us, i.e., the choice set. This has large impacts in a group setting, where altering the choice set can encourage agreement or create new conflict between individuals. We formulated this as an algorithmic question: how can we optimize the choice set for some objective?
We showed that choice set optimization is NP-hard for natural objectives under standard discrete choice models; however, we also found that model restrictions makes promoting a choice easier than encouraging a group to agree or disagree. A more general characterization of this divide would be useful. We also developed approximation algorithms for these hard problems that are effective in practice, although there remains a gap between theoretical approximation bounds and real-world data observations. Notice that x * and y are swapped in the two trees. We wish to promote x * . With just the choice set C, a prefers x * to y, but b does not. To make b prefer x * to y, we need to cannibalize y by adding z i items. However, this simultaneously cannibalizes x * in a's tree, so we need to be careful not to introduce too much additional utility. To ensure a prefers x * , we need to pick Z such that
To ensure b prefers x * , we need
Since the z are all integers, we must then have z ∈Z z = t. If we could efficiently promote x * , we could efficiently find such a Z . □ A.3 Proof of Theorem 6.
Proof. By reduction from Subset Sum. Let S, t be an instance of Subset Sum. Let A = {a, b}, C = {x * , y}, C = S, and s = z ∈S z. Make aspects χ z ,ψ z , γ z for each z ∈ S as well as two more aspects χ,ψ . The items have aspects as follows.
The individuals have the following utilities on aspects, where 0 < ε < 1:
We want to promote x * . Notice that x * and y have disjoint aspects. Thus the choice probabilities from C are proportional to the sum of the item's aspects:
To promote x * , we need to make b prefer x * to y. Adding a z item cannibalizes from a's preference for x * and b's preference for y. As in the NL proof, we want to add just enough z items to make b prefer x * to y without making a prefer y to x * .
First, notice that the γ z aspects have no effect on the individuals' relative preference for x * and y. If we introduce the alternative z, then if a picks the aspect χ z , y will be eliminated. The remaining aspects of x * , namely x * ′ \ {χ z }, have combined utility s − z, as does γ z . Therefore a will be equallly likely to pick x * and z. Symmetric reasoning shows that if b chooses aspect ψ z , then b will end up picking y with probability 1/2. This means that when we include alternatives Z ⊆ C, each aspect χ z ,ψ z for z ∈ Z effectively contributes z/2 to a's utility for x * and b's utility for y rather than the full z. The optimal solution is therefore a set Z of alternatives whose sum is t, since that will cause a to have effective utility s −t/2 10 on x * , which exceeds its utility s − t/2 − ε on y. Meanwhile, b's effective utility on y will also be s − t/2, which is smaller than its utility s − t/2 + ε on x * . If we include less alternative weight, b will prefer y. If we include more, a will prefer y. Therefore if we could efficiently find the optimal set of alternatives to promote x * , we could efficiently find a subset of S with sum t. □
B RESTRICTIONS ON MNL THAT MAKE AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT TRACTABLE
As we saw in the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3, Agreement and Disagreement are hard in the MNL model even when individuals have identical utilities on alternatives. This is possible because the individuals have different sums of utilities on C; one unit of utility on an alternative has a weaker effect for individuals with higher utility sums on C. To address the issue of identifiability, we assume each individual's utility sum over U is zero in this section. This allows us to meaningfully compare the sum of utilities of two different individuals.
Definition 2. If an individual a has x ∈U u a (x) = 0, then the stubbornness of a is σ a = x ∈C e u(x ) .
We call this quantity "stubbornness" since it quantifies how reluctant an individual is to change its probabilities on C given a unit of utility on an alternative. Proposition 1. In an MNL model where all individuals are equally stubborn and have identical utilities on alternatives, the solution to Agreement is C.
Proof. Assume utilities are in standard form, with x ∈U u a (x) = 0. Let σ = x ∈C e u(x ) be each individual's stubborness and let Z be a set of alternatives. Suppose all individuals have the same utility u(z) on an alternative z. The disagreement between two individuals about a single item x in C is then:
Notice that this strictly descreases if z ∈Z e u(z) increases, so we minimize D by adding in all of the alternatives. □
The same reasoning also allows us to solve Disagreement in this restricted MNL model. Proof. If a set Z has total exp-utility t a to individual a, then it is placed in L at position ⌊log 1+δ t a ⌋ in dimension a. So, if two sets Z , Z ′ with exp-utility totals t a , t ′ a to individual a are mapped to the same cell of L, then for all a ∈ A, ⌊log 1+δ t a ⌋ = ⌊log 1+δ t ′ a ⌋. We can therefore bound t ′ a : log 1+δ t a − 1 < log 1+δ t ′ a < log 1+δ t a + 1.
Exponentiating both sides with base 1 + δ and simplifying yields
With this fact in hand, we proceed by induction on i. When i = 0, C i is empty and the lemma holds. Now suppose that i > 0 and that the lemma holds for i − 1. Every set in C i was made by adding (a) zero elements or (b) one element to a set in C i−1 . We consider these two cases separately.
(a) For any set Z ⊆ C i that is also contained in C i−1 , we know by the inductive hypothesis that some element in L i−1 satisfied the inequality. Since we never overwrite cells, the lemma also holds for Z after iteration i.
(b) Now consider sets Z ′ ⊆ C i that were formed by adding the new element z to a set Z ⊆ C i−1 . In the inner for loop, we at some point encountered the cell containing the set Y ∈ L i−1 satisfying the lemma for set Z by the inductive hypothesis. Let y a be the exputility totals for Y and t a for Z . Notice that the exp-utility totals of Z ′ are exactly t a + e az . Starting with the inductive hypothesis, we see that the exp-utility totals of Y ∪ {z} satisfy t a + e az
When we go to place Y ∪ {z} in a cell, it might be unoccupied, in which case we place it in L i and the lemma holds for Z ′ . If it is occupied by some other set, then by applying Eq. (6) we find that the lemma also holds for Z ′ . □
C.2 Polynomial bound on runtime of Algorithm 1
The runtime of Algorithm 1 is O((m + kn 2 )(1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) n ). We can show that the second part is bounded by a polynomial in k, m, and 1 ε :
3 Adapting Algorithm 1 for CDM with guarantees for special cases
We are able to adapt Algorithm 1 for the CDM model, but we only maintain the approximation error bounds under special cases of the structure of the "pulls". Still, we can use this algorithm as a principled heuristic and it tends to work well in practice. As a first step, we use the alternative parametrization of the model used by Seshadri et al. [45, Eq. (1) ], which has fewer parameters. In this description of the model, utilities and context effects are 11 merged into a single utility-adjusted pull q a (z, x) = p a (z, x)−u a (x), with the special case q a (x, x) = 0. We then have
Matching the notation of the proof of Theorem 7, we use the shorthand e ax = exp( w ∈C q a (w, x)).
To adapt Algorithm 1 to the CDM, we expand L i to have nk dimensions for each individual-item pair, increasing the runtime to O((m + kn 2 )(1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) nk ). This is only practical if nk is small, but as we have seen, Agreement, Disagreement, and Promotion are all NP-hard even with n = 2 and k = 2 or 3. Each individualitem dimension stores e ax , the total exp-utility of that item to that individual given that we have included some set of alternatives. When we include an additional item from C, we place the new sets in L i with updated e ax values.
This only preserves the ε-additive approximation if alternatives (items in C) have zero context effects on each other; however, they may still have context effects on items in C. Formally, we need q a (z, z ′ ) = 0 for all z, z ′ ∈ C and a ∈ A. Although this is a serious restriction, it leaves Agreement, Disagreement, and Promotion NP-hard, as the CDM we used in our proofs had this form (see also Appendix C.5 for how to apply Algorithm 1 to Promotion). If this version of the algorithm is applied to a general CDM, it may experience higher error. Nonetheless, our real-data experiments show it to be a good heuristic.
For the following analysis, we assume a CDM with zero context effects between items in C. We need to verify that if every item's exp-utility is approximated to within factor (1 + β) ±1 , then the total disagreement of a set is approximated to within ε as we had in the MNL case. The approximation error guarantee increases to 4ε in the restricted CDM version-to recover the ε-additive approximation, we can make δ smaller by a factor of 4.
Recall that Z ′ is the representative in L m of the optimal set of alternatives Z * . For compactness, we define T a to be the denominator of Eq. (7), with T ′ a and T * a referring to those denominators under the choice sets C ∪Z ′ and C ∪Z * , respectively. This is where we require zero context effects between alternatives: if alternatives interact, then storing T a and e ax in the table is not enough to determine choice probabilities when we add a new alternative.
The difference in the analysis begins when we bound Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) on both sides using the fact that each exp-utility sum is approximated within a 1 + β factor (so the probability denomiators T a are also approximated within this factor):
Based on the lower bound, the difference between Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z * ) and Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) could be as large as
Now considering the upper bound, the difference between Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z * ) and Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) could be as large as 2 . This is at most 4β:
So D(Z ′ ) and D(Z * ) are within 4β n 2 k = 4ε.
C.4 Adapting Algorithm 1 for NL with full guarantees
We can also adapt Algorithm 1 for the NL model, and unlike the CDM, the ε-additive approximation holds in all parameter regimes.
Recall that the NL tree has two types of leaves: choice set items and alternative items. Let P a be the set of internal nodes of individual a's tree that have at least one alternative item as a child and let p = max a ∈A |P a |. If we know the total exp-utility that alternatives contribute as children of each v ∈ P a , then we can compute a's choice probabilites over items in C in polynomial time.
With this in mind, we modify Algorithm 1 by having dimensions in L for each individual for each of their nodes in P a . This results in ≤ np dimensions. The algorithm then keeps track of the exp-utility sums from alternatives under each node in P a for each individual. The exponent in the runtime increases to (at most) np, but this remains tractable for some hard instances, such as those in our hardness proofs. In some cases, we can dramatically improve the runtime of the algorithm: if the subtree under an internal node contains only alternatives as leaves in an individuals's tree, then we only need one dimension L for that individual's entire subtree, and it has only two cells: one for sets that contain at least one alternative in that subtree, and one for sets that do not. The only factor that affects the choice probabilities of items in C is whether that subtree is "active" and its root can be chosen.
We now show how the error from exp-utility sums of alternatives propagates to choice probabilities. In the NL model, Pr(a ← x | C) is the product of probabilities that a chooses each ancestor of x as a descends down its tree. Let v 1 , . . . , v ℓ be the nodes in a's tree along the path from the root to x. For compactness, we use Pr(x, Z ) instead of Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ) in the following analysis.
Pick δ ≤ ([ε/(2k n 2 ) + 1] 1/ℓ − 1)/m and recall that β = 2mδ . We can use the same analysis as in the proof of Theorem 7 to find that for any set Z * ⊆ C, there exists some Z ′ ∈ L such that Pr(x, Z * ) = Pr(v 1 , Z * ) · · · · · Pr(v x , Z * ) < Pr(v 1 , Z ′ ) + β 2 · · · · · Pr(v x , Z ′ ) + 
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Now for the lower bound, pick δ ≤ (1 − [1 − ε/(2k n 2 )] 1/ℓ )/m. Again from the proof of Theorem 7:
Pr(x, Z * ) = Pr(v 1 , Z * ) · · · · · Pr(v x , Z * )
Let h be the maximum height of any indivdual's NL tree (so ℓ ≤ h). Then, by picking δ = min{[ε/(2k n 2 ) + 1] 1/h − 1, 1 − [1 − ε/(2k n 2 )] 1/h }/m, we find that Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z * ) and Pr(a ← x | C ∪Z ′ ) differ by less than ε/(k n 2 ) for all x ∈ C and a ∈ A, meaning that the total disagreement between a and b cannot differ by more than ε as before.
Unfortunately, this means we need to make δ exponentially (in h) smaller in the NL model. Put another way, our error bound gets exponentially worse as h increases if we keep δ constant. However, we have seen that there are NP-hard families of NL instances in which h is a small constant (e.g. 2 in our hardness proof), so once again this algorithm is an exponential improvement over brute force. Moreover, the error bound here is often far from tight, since we use the very loose bounds Pr(v i , Z ′ ) ≤ 1 in the analysis. This means the algorithm will tend to outperform the worst-case guarantee by a significant margin.
C.5 Adapting Algorithm 1 for CDM Promotion with special case guarantees
Using this idea, Algorithm 1 can then be applied to Promotion in the (restricted) CDM model with only a small modification to the CDM version described in Appendix C.3: at the end of the algorithm, we return the set that results in the maximum number of individuals having x * as an ε/2-favorite item. Additionally, we choose δ = ε/(20m). Following the analysis in Appendix C.3, we find that Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z * ) and Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) differ by at most max{1 − 1 (1+ε /10) 2 , (1 + ε/10) 2 − 1} for all x when δ = ε/(20m). On the interval [0, 1], this is bounded by ε/4. Thus, if x * is the favorite item for a given the optimal choice set C ∪ Z * , then it must be an ε/2-favorite of individual a given C ∪ Z ′ . This is because when we go from C ∪ Z * to C ∪ Z ′ , the choice probability of x * can shrink by at most ε/4 and the choice probability for any other item can grow by at most ε/4.
Since the choice set C ∪ Z ′ has at least as many individuals with x * as their ε-favorite as C ∪ Z * has with x * as their favorite among C, Algorithm 1 ε-approximates Promotion in the CDM with no context effects between utilities. Moreover, not having to compute D(Z ) makes the runtime of Algorithm 1 O(m(1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) nk ) when applied to Promotion in the CDM. In the general CDM, this algorithm is only a heuristic.
C.6 Adapting Algorithm 1 for NL Promotion with full guarantees
A very similar idea allows us to apply the NL version of Algorithm 1 from Appendix C.4 to Promotion and retain an approximation guarantee. As before, use the NL version and return the set that results in the maximum number of individuals having x * as an ε/2favorite item. However, we instead use δ = min{(ε/8 + 1) 1/h − 1, 1 − (1 − ε/8) 1/h }/m, which by the analysis in Appendix C.4 results in Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z * ) and Pr(a ← x | C ∪ Z ′ ) differing by at most ε/4. As in the CDM case, this guarantees that if x * is the favorite item for a given the optimal choice set C ∪ Z * , then it must be an ε/2-favorite of a given C ∪ Z ′ . Therefore this version of Algorithm 1 ε-approximates Promotion in the NL model with runtime O(m(1 + ⌊log 1+δ s⌋) np ).
D EXPERIMENT SUPPLEMENTS D.1 Simple example of poor performance for Greedy
As we saw in experimental data, Greedy can perform poorly even in small instances of Agreement. Below we provide an MNL instance with n = m = k = 2 for which the error of the greedy solution is approximately 1. With only two individuals, 0 ≤ D(Z ) ≤ 2, so an error of 1 is very large. In the bad instance for greedy, A = {a, b}, C = {x, y}, C = {p, q}, and the utilities are as follows. In this instance of Agreement, the greedy solution is D(∅) ≈ 0.9951 (including either p or q alone increases disagreement), while the optimal solution is D({p, q}) ≈ 0.0009.
